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We conduct an analysis on Booking Holdings, Inc. and the Online Travel Market in which it operates 
to understand the trends opportunities and risks driving the market. Following this analysis, we focus 
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Modest growth ahead  
In the search for room nights 
 Based on our FY20 target price $2,102.97, with total 
return of 7.6%, we issue a HOLD recommendation for BKNG. We 
expect share repurchases of $4.2 billion in 2020, accounting for 
5.2% of total return. 
 BKNG’s room nights growth has slowed from 21.1% in 
2017 to 10.9% in 2019, as the shift from offline to online bookings 
in Europe and the U.S. matures. The Group’s future performance 
is highly dependent on its ability to find new sources to derive 
room nights growth. Until 2026, we expect its room nights to 
grow at an 8.7% CAGR. 
 We believe BKNG has clear opportunities to boost room 
nights growth, through: 1) further expansion in China and 
Southeast Asia, driven by strategic partnerships, 2) winning the 
race to deliver innovative and differentiated products as the 
Connected Trip and 3) capturing a share of the emerging 
alternative accommodations market. 
 We see the Group’s future performance threatened by 
key risks in the market, particularly 1) the loss of direct channel 
traffic to Google Travel, resulting in higher performance 
marketing costs and lower margins, and 2) macroeconomic 
instability taking a negative toll on demand in the travel sector. 
Company description 
Booking Holdings Inc. is a leading Online Travel Agency, 
connecting customers to travel service providers in over 230 
countries and territories. The Group operates six primary brands: 
Booking.com, KAYAK, priceline.com, agoda, Rentalcars.com 
and OpenTable. 
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(Values in USD millions) 2018 2019E 2020F 
Revenues 14,527 15,041 16,895 
     Revenue growth 14.6% 3.5% 12.3% 
     Performance MKT / Rev 30.61% 29.31% 28.95% 
EBITDA 5,767 5,742 5,742 
NOPLAT 4,429 4,346 5,063 
EPS ($) 45 109 126 
P / E 21 19 17 
Economic Profit / Rev 27.8% 26.0% 27.5% 
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Booking Holdings recognizes Booking.com, Rentalcars.com, agoda, 
priceline.com, KAYAK and OpenTable as its 6 primary brands, which manage a 
variety of other secondary subsidiaries. Before 2018, the name of the group was 
“Priceline Group”, named after its flagship brand at the time. In this report, we refer 
to Booking Holdings, Inc. as Booking Holdings, Booking, BKNG, the Group, the 
company and to the brand Booking.com as Booking.com. 
Priceline.com became popular for its innovative “Name Your Own Price” option, 
which allowed consumers to bid on the price they wanted to pay for a product 
without previous knowledge of the name of the provider. Despite its success, 
Priceline gradually phased out this service. Today, the brand offers deals on hotel 
rooms, airline tickets, rental cars, vacation packages and cruises. The move into 
the retail hotel business was made by several acquisitions, most importantly 
ActiveHotels in 2004.  
Booking.com grew from a small start-up to one of the largest travel e-commerce 
companies in the world, providing room nights, car rentals and airline tickets 
reservations. A little over 10 years after Booking.com was acquired by Priceline, 
the Group changed its name to Booking Holdings, in recognition of its main 
revenue source, Booking.com. The company generates approximately 76% of the 
group’s revenues every year.  
Like booking.com, agoda is an online accommodation reservation service that 
operates mainly in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) region. It was acquired as a key 
strategic move into the Asian market.  
Rentalcars.com, formerly known as TravelJigsaw, is a leading car hire booking 
service. It connects its customers to car hiring companies, enabling them to 
compare between agencies and choose the best price. As of 2018, 
Rentalcars.com integrated the business of Booking.com.  
KAYAK is a leading online meta-search service that searches and compares rates 
for airline tickets, accommodation and rental cars from hundreds of travel websites 
at once. KAYAK operates 7 international brands: KAYAK, SWOODOO, checkfelix, 
momondo, Cheapflights, Mundi and HotelsCombined. 
Finally, OpenTable is a restaurant reservations and information service. As a 
result of an internationalization strategy in the past years, it now has offices in the 
U.S., U.K., India, Australia and Mexico.  
 
 








Although OpenTable works quite independently, the remaining 5 main brands have 
their business highly interconnected. For instance, agoda and Booking provide 
flight comparison and car rental services on their websites that are operated de 
facto by KAYAK or priceline.com (flights search) and Rentalcars.com (car rentals). 
Furthermore, depending on its characteristics, a property listed on priceline.com 
or Booking.com can also be automatically listed on agoda and vice versa. This 
allows customers to keep using the website they are familiar with even in countries 
or regions where it has little or no representation.  
Business model 
Booking Holdings Inc., as a technological company operating in the travel services 
industry, has a rather complex revenue model that can be broken down into three 
main revenue streams: Agency revenues, Merchant revenues, and Advertising 
& Other revenues (Figure 2). The first two are mainly derived from Booking.com, 
agoda, priceline.com and Rentalcars.com, while Advertisement & Other revenues 
are earned through KAYAK and OpenTable. 
 Agency and Merchant revenues 
Agency and Merchant revenues are mostly derived from the sale of room nights, 
rental car days and airline tickets to travellers, but (at a much smaller scale) also 
include the sale of travel packages, cruise tickets, tours, activities and airport taxis. 
Room nights sold is the most important driver for the company, accounting for 
93.7% of the total Agency and Merchant revenues, and 86.5% of total revenues 
in 2019, according to our estimates. In the same year, our estimates point to the 
sale of 843 million room nights, 77 million rental car days and 7 million airline 
tickets, which lead to total Gross bookings1 of $97 billion (Figure 3). We estimate 
2019’s average fee charged to be 14.3% for room nights, 25.0% for rental cars 
and 3.5% for rental car days2 (Figure 4). 
Agency revenues are those where the Group does not receive payments directly 
from travellers, but rather from the travel service provider (accommodation owners, 
car rental companies, airlines), typically at the end of the month. Most of these 
revenues come from reservation commissions (on room nights, rental car days 
and airline tickets) and a small fraction is derived from ancillary fees, such as 
transaction fees and some travel insurance products. 
In the Merchant model, travellers make payments directly to the Group, most 
commonly at the time of booking. Merchant revenues include the net transaction 
 
1 Gross bookings is the annual sum of total bookings paid by the final customers in agency and merchant models. 
2 Detailed information about estimation’s assumptions in Revenues Model Chapter. 
Figure 2: Revenues streams as a % 
of total revenues; Source: Company 
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Figure 4: Accommodations' average 
fee charged; Source: Company 
reports, Analysts estimates 
 
 








revenues, ie the difference between the price charged to travellers and the amount 
the Group owes to travel service providers, as well as ancillary fees, credit card 
processing rebates and customer processing fees.  
The Group is currently investing in having more properties operating under the 
Merchant Model (Figure 2). This comes as a response to customers’ increasing 
demand for different online payment options (Figure 5), which many property 
owners – particularly in the alternative accommodations market, with less 
resources available – do not have the ability to provide.  
Advertising & Other revenues  
The last stream of revenues, Advertising and Other revenues, is derived by 
KAYAK’s and OpenTable's websites. While KAYAK offers metasearch engines, 
which earn revenues by displaying advertisements or when customers purchase 
rooms, flights and car rentals through referrals, OpenTable collects revenues 
through restaurant reservations and subscription fees.  
A dynamic overview 
Revenues: BKNG’s revenues have grown at a double-digit rate from 2015 to 2018 
(CAGR of 12.2%, Figure 6), mostly driven by growth in room nights. From 2016 
onwards, room nights’ growth has decelerated (Figure 7) dragging revenues 
growth down.  
However, in 2019E, although room nights grew 10.9%, revenues only grew 3.5%. 
This was due to a 3.4% estimated decrease in Average Daily Rates (ADR) for room 
nights (Figure 8). The steep drop, considering the diversity of geographies in which 
BKNG operates and the diversity of its brands, can be explained by: 1) higher 
business volume growth in countries with lower ADRs (Southeast Asia, China), 
and slower growth in countries with higher ADRs (Western Europe, U.S.); 2) a shift 
in demand towards alternative accommodations, which are typically cheaper; and 
3) higher price competition pressures, which we attribute mostly to increasing 
popularity of metasearch price comparison tools (such as Google Travel)3. 
Room nights: in the past few years, BKNG’s room nights growth was achieved 
mainly through organic expansion, although strategical acquisitions also played a 
role. The organic increase in the number of room nights was derived from two main 
factors: 1) increasing market share in countries where BKNG’s products were not 
fully established, namely Southeast Asia and China4 and 2) increasing market 
demand for room nights in locations where Booking was already well established, 
 
3 Detailed explanation further in Competitors chapter. 
4 Read Opportunities Chapter for further detail. 
Figure 5: Global eCom Payment 
Methods’ forecast; Source: Worldpay 
Figure 6: BKNG's revenue and revenue's 
growth; Source: Company reports, 
Analysts estimates 
Figure 8: Estimated Room nights 























Total Revenues YoY Growth
Figure 7: Driver's year-on-year growth; 
















































such as Europe (Figure 9). Regarding inorganic growth, the acquisition of 
HotelsCombined, in 2018 was the only acquisition in the past 5 years contributing 
to room nights growth. According to our estimates, HotelsCombined sold 
approximately 11 million room nights in 2017, accounting for 2% of BKNG’s 13% 
room nights growth in 2018. 
Rental car days: following the same pattern as room nights, rental car days growth 
also decreased in the past three years (Figure 7). In 2019E, however, it is expected 
to grow 3.5%, as a consequence of the recent integration of Rentalcars.com with 
Booking.com. The strategical integration is part of a broader strategy to invest in 
the Connected Trip: a consumer experience with less frictions, allowing costumers 
to plan their whole trip online (flight, accommodation, car, experiences, airport 
taxis, etc)5.  
Airline tickets: airline tickets followed a different path in the last years, with 
negative growth in 2016 and 2017 and a recovery in 2018 and 2019 (Figure 7). 
While we associate the slowdown to higher competition in the market, propelled 
by metasearch engines’ predominance (which favour a more balanced distribution 
of market shares), we consider the recovery in 2018 and 2019 might be a 
consequence of efforts related to the Connected Trip. However, it is hard to isolate 
the different factors weighing in on these results and reach an absolute conclusion. 
Cost Structure 
The company’s largest costs are Performance marketing (29.3% as a percentage 
of revenues), Brand Marketing (3.6% as a percentage of revenues) and personnel-
related costs (14.9% as a percentage of revenues). Nevertheless, BKNG’s 
EBITDA margin, at 38.2% in 2019E, is one of its most important competitive 
advantages (Table 1). 
BKNG’s marketing costs can be separated into performance and brand marketing: 
performance marketing includes search engines’ keywords (Google AdWords) 
and metasearch referrals (Google Travel, SkyScanner, TripAdvisor), while brand 
marketing, as the name suggests, includes brand awareness campaigns on social 
media, TV and outdoor advertising. As a percentage of revenues, the latter has 
been increasing in the past years, while the former started decreasing in 2018. 
This decrease is part of the company’s strategy to be less dependent on 
indirect channels (Table 1), due to alleged lower return on investment in paid 
channels.  
 
5 Read the Chapter Opportunities for further detail 
Table 1: BKNG's cost structure; 
Source: Company reports, Analysts 
estimates 
Figure 9: Number of nights spent in 
tourist accommodations in Europe 

















BKNG’s EBITDA margin is relatively high when compared to its peers (Figure 
10), standing at 40% in 2018, while Expedia’s stood at 15% and Trip.com’s at 12%. 
Two competitive advantages of the Group justify these differences.  
The first relates to the Group’s low dependence on marketing costs, given its 
stronger brand recognition (stronger direct channels lead to lower dependence on 
paid channels6, Figure 11). For BKNG, Marketing & Sales costs reached 39.8% of 
Revenues in 2018, while for Expedia, for example, this figure was as high as 
51.4%. Conversely, Trip.com presented Sales & Marketing costs even lower than 
Booking’s, at 31%. We believe the low figure is justified by the absence of Google 
in Trip.com’s largest market, China.  
Secondly, BKNG benefits from large economies of scale, resulting in lower 
personnel costs (as a % of sales). While Booking’s revenues per employee in 2018 
were $593 thousand, Expedia’s stood at $458 thousand and Trip.com’s at $104 
thousand (Figure 12). The latter is quite low even when considering lower average 
wages in China. Despite high revenue per employee when compared to its peers, 
the Group reports growing costs per employee. Personnel costs as a percentage 
of total revenues were 14.1%, up from 2017 and 2016’s 13.1% and 12.6%, 
respectively. We interpret growing costs per employee as a consequence of the 
expansion of the merchant model, which requires higher personnel costs per 
sale. Moreover, we believe workforce specialization also plays a role in 
increasing costs per employee, particularly as data analysis and AI have become 
part of the Group’s core offer. 
Invested Capital  
Booking is non capital-intensive company and in 2018 its operating invested 
capital was 34.7% as a percentage of revenues, a rather low value comparing with 
Expedia’s 68.6% and Trip.com’s 516.5% (Table 2). This difference is explained by 
lower values of PP&E and Goodwill (as a percentage of revenues) and higher 
Working Capital (as a percentage of revenues). BKNG’s PP&E is related to the 
company’s buildings and offices, as well as “Capitalized software development”. 
TCOM’s (Trip.com’s ticker) PP&E is higher, since the company has a higher 
number of offices and buildings, due to customer service needs related to its 
transportation tickets business. EXPE (Expedia’s ticker), in its turn, manages more 
brands than Booking (and therefore, has more offices and buildings) and has more 
“Capitalized software development”.  
 
6 A direct customer goes directly to BKNG’s websites, while paid channel’s customers are redirected by paid clicks or 
trough metasearch platforms (like TripAdvisor and Google Travel)  
Figure 10: 2018’s peers' EBITDA Margin; 
Source: Companies reports 
Figure 12: Personnel costs (thousands); 
Source: Companies reports 
Figure 11: Keyword's interest over time 
Source: Google Trends 
Table 2: Peer's 2018’s operating invested 
capital; Source: Companies reports 
Figure 13: Deferred merchant bookings 































































BKNG’s Goodwill as a percentage of revenues is much lower than EXPE’s and 
TCOM’s due to a less aggressive acquisition strategy: since 2014, while BKNG’s 
acquisitions’ value totalled $3.5 billion, EXPE’s totalled at least $6.2 billion7 [1]. 
TCOM’s high Goodwill value is related to its merger with the Chinese company 
Qunar in 2015. 
Booking’s Net Working Capital was lower than EXPE’s and TCOM’s in 2018 due 
to lower Deferred merchant bookings (7% as a percentage of revenues against 
39% and 86%, respectively, Table 3). In EXPE’s case, this difference is explained 
by the fact that only 21% of BKNG’s revenues are derived from the Merchant 
model, while for Expedia this figure is as high as 52%. A Deferred merchant 
booking corresponds to liabilities owed by OTAs to service providers for receiving 
payment directly from customers  
In 2019E Deferred merchant booking’s account as a percentage of revenues 
increased, justified by Booking’s Merchant revenues’ increase. Moreover, 
Accounts receivable, which is related to Agency revenues (the model in which 
service providers pay fees to OTAs at the end of the month) has decreased, due 
to a slowdown in this business model’s revenues in 2019E (Figure 2). 
Cash flow  
In 2019E, we expect Core Operating and Investing cash flow to be $5.0 billion and 
-$0.4 billion, respectively, and Non-Core Operating and Investing cash flow to be 
$0.5 billion and $6.3 billion, respectively (Figure 14). The high Non-Core Investing 
cash flow is linked to a high investment in marketable securities (governments’ 
bonds, corporate bonds, equity securities). Nevertheless, this value more than 
halved from 2018 to 2019 due to the maturation of $6.77 billion of Governments’ 
bonds, that contributed to historically high cash reserves by the end of the year (at 
31% the revenues). 
We expect the company to reinvest part of these cash reserves in safe marketable 
securities, for example US government bonds, as a way to protect its investors 
against downsides and slowdowns. Moreover, in the past 5 years, the company 
has been investing in other companies’ securities, mainly in Asia, as part of 
commercial agreements, (as it is the case with Didi Chuxing, Grab, Meituan and 
Trip.com)8 and we foresee BKNG will continue investing in these agreements, as 
well as in new agreements, as a way of gaining sales and brand recognition in 
countries where it has a small market share.  
 
7 Not accounting for 3 acquisitions in 2018 and 2019 whose terms were not disclosed. 
8 Read Oportunities’ chapter for further detail. 
Table 3: BKNG's net working capital; 
Sources: Company reports, analysts 
estimates 
Figure 15: Cash reserves over time; 
Source: Company reports, Analysts 
estimates 
Figure 14: 2019’s Operations and 
Invested cash flow; Source: 
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Share Repurchase Program 
Although BKNG has never paid dividends and does not expect to do so in the 
foreseeable future, it has been conducting a stock repurchase program, financed 
by cash reserves. From 2014 to the third quarter of 2019, the group repurchased 
23.7% of its shares outstanding, worth $18.7 billion, of which $6.2 billion were 
repurchased in 2018 and $6.8 billion until the third quarter of 2019 (Figure 16). The 
group has a current authorization to buy back $10.9 billion worth of shares and 
expects to complete it in 2 to 3 years. Given the company’s historically high cash 
reserves, we expect repurchases of $2.0 billion in the fourth quarter and $4.2 billion 
in 2020. The latter account for 5% of our target shareholder’s total return. 
Through share repurchases the company is inflating EPS artificially9 instead 
of investing in internal growth. We understand it might be choosing to return 
capital to its shareholders over investing for example in Government securities, 
given the current low interest rate environment. However, it is somewhat 
concerning that the company is not using this cash to invest in projects that would 
yield higher returns to investors. The Group’s CEO has stated he is not afraid to 
make large investments, as long as they are the right investments, hinting he is 
waiting for a big opportunity in the market, possible another high-profile acquisition. 
Fiscal Policy 
In 2018, BKNG paid $898 million in operating cash taxes (Figure 17) at a 17.4% 
effective tax rate. In the same year, 99.3% of the company’s income came from its 
international business (Booking.com, agoda and Rentalcars.com). For this 
business, we considered corporate taxes of 25.0%, 19.0% and 17.0% in the 
Netherlands, UK and Singapore, respectively. We estimate 47.8% of 
Booking.com’s income qualifies for the Innovative Tax Box (5.0% until 2018 and 
7.0% onwards), a benefit created to attract investment in The Netherlands of 
companies that can prove to be innovating in their activity. As for KAYAK, 
priceline.com and OpenTable, we considered the U.S.’s 21.0% corporate tax rate. 
Capital Structure 
In December 2019E, we estimate the company’s market Debt-to-Equity (D/E) ratio 
to be 11.7%, a low value when compared to the industry’s average (Figure 18). 
The company paid $318 million in interests, at an implicit average interest rate of 
3.8% (including operating leases’ implicit interest), obtaining a $67 million tax 
shield. The company’s credit rating was recently upgraded from Baa1 to A3 by 
Moody’s [2]. Moreover, interest coverage ratio was 14.3, a high value, meaning 
 
9 An artificial increase in EPS is achieved by decreasing the number of shares, rather than by increasing earnings. 
Figure 18: Comparables' Market D/E; 











































































Figure 16: Number of shares outstanding 
(million) and share repurchases ($ million); 
Source: Company report, Analysts 
estimates 
Figure 17: Taxes reconciliation in 
































the company has the ability to pay its debt obligations, all the more considering its 
high levels of cash reserves.  
Performing a sensitivity analysis to D/E, we acknowledge that while an all-equity 
discounted cashflow would lead to a share price of $1,880, a D/E of 20%, closer 
to the industry’s average, would lead to over $2,286. The latter would represent an 
8.6% increase compared to our target share price at the current 11% D/E (Figure 
20). Considering these factors, we believe there are no reason for solvency 
concerns at the current D/E levels. At this point, there is no evidence the company 
will change its target D/E level in the short term.   
Shareholder’s structure 
Institutions hold roughly 95% of all shares outstanding [3], while 4% are held by 
the general public and less than 1% by employees as part of stock compensation 
benefits. 41% of the investors pursue an Intrinsic value strategy (long term), 34% 
pursue a Traders growth strategy (short term) and 25% of the shares are invested 
mechanically (ETFs, market tracking portfolios). The low share of Traders growth 
strategy for BKNG’s stock, below the U.S. Equity market’s average [3], 
contributes to lower share price volatility. On the contrary, a higher-than-
average Intrinsic strategy share [3] (with lower trading frequency and higher 
acceptance of short term bad results) should positively influence management to 
focus on driving long term returns. 
Management 
Glenn Fogel, BKNG’s CEO since January 2017, joined the group in 2000. While 
head of BKNG’s Worldwide Strategy division, he was responsible for the 
acquisitions of ActiveHotels and Booking.com, as well as for commercial 
partnerships with Chinese companies. We place credibility on his leadership, given 
his successful history in the company. Although his 2018’s annual compensation 
was twice the size of the average compensation for CEOs of similar size U.S. 
companies ($20 million), 96.3% of his compensation was performance-based. 
Industry overview 
Bloomberg places Booking Holdings in the Media industry, in the sub industry of 
Internet Based Services, within the Communications' Sector. However, we insert 
the Group in the Travel & Tourism industry for the purpose of analysing it in light 
of the major market trends, challenges and opportunities, guiding the business 
forward. Geographically, Booking Holdings' key markets are Europe, the U.S. and 
Asia, namely China and Southeast Asia. 
Figure 20: Share price sensitivity to market 
Debt-to-Equity  
Figure 21: BKNG's CEO 
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Travel & Tourism Industry Growth  
Booking Holdings’ growth is highly correlated to the Travel & Tourism industry’s 
growth. To the exception of 2015, the latter has continuously expanded since the 
last recession [4]. The sector is driven by economic growth, growing middle class 
and internet penetration in emerging countries, as well as visa facilitation policies 
and affordable travel solutions [4].  
Growing demand for Tours & Activities 
The global market for tours and activities is estimated to be $150 billion annually, 
and research suggests expected growth of 9% per year [5]. This market includes 
a broad range of activities from museum tickets, to tour reservations or multi-day 
activities. The fact that most of these activities are still likely to be purchased offline 
(80% as of 2017 [6]), represents an opportunity for Online Travel Agencies to bring 
these customers online. By expanding their offers to these activities, OTAs are not 
only responding to customer’s demand but also capitalizing on the cross-selling of 
products in their websites. 
Going Mobile 
The continuing decrease in the number of computers sold worldwide [7] is 
evidence of the increasing consumer preference for mobile rather than computer 
platforms. We believe the shift towards mobile bookings is positive for OTAs, since 
we expect customers using mobile apps will likely only comparison shop10 between 
the apps they have installed and will come back to these same apps whenever 
they need booking services. These dynamics benefit brands with higher brand 
recognition, as these will likely be the most downloaded apps. Moreover, mobile 
sales contribute to the direct channel, as OTAs do not need to incur in any 
performance marketing costs. 
Consolidation 
Consolidation has played an important role in the travel industry for some time, 
particularly in the airlines and hotels business. In a market where differentiation 
between product offers is low, Booking Holdings and The Expedia Group have 
used mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to gain scale, strengthening their 
competitive positions as market leaders [8] and to diversify their offers [9]. Through 
acquisitions of smaller companies, often tech start-ups, OTAs are able to quickly  
 
10 Comparison shopping refers to comparing product prices between different stores or suppliers before making a purchase in order to 
achieve the best deals 
Figure 22: BKNG Revenue Growth highly 
correlated to Global International Tourism 



























Figure 23: Consumers' spending 
preferences; Source: Skift's 2017 U.S. 




Spend more on better activities
Spend more on nicer hotel room
Figure 24: U.S. Digital Travel Sales 












Figure 26: Volume of M&A in Travel & 
Tourism; Source: BusinessWire [1] 
Figure 25: Share of Internet users 
worldwide who used a mobile payment 
service in December 2018; Source: 
Bloomberg Intelligence [8] 




















incorporate new technologies or innovative products in which those start-ups 
specialize, while maintaining focus on the core aspects of the business [11].  
Challenges 
Google Travel & Google Flights 
Google Travel is a metasearch engine that collects and organizes information 
from travel websites and displays it to travellers looking for flights, hotels or car 
rentals. Launched in 2019, this feature is gradually being integrated into Google’s 
widely used app, Google Maps (Figure 28). It enables easy comparison shopping 
for travellers who can then make an informed decision on which travel agency to 
purchase from. These travellers would otherwise search for "hotel room" or "Lisbon 
to London flight" on Google’s search engine and look into the 2 or 3 websites that 
appeared on top. As such, Google Travel intensifies competition, particularly 
price competition, for large players by giving visibility to smaller (often cheaper) 
players who might otherwise not even appear on the traveller's radar. We believe 
Google Travel’s increasing popularity will force companies such as Booking and 
Expedia to lower their commissions at least to some extent in order to stay 
competitive. We factor this into our forecasted drivers, estimating a gradual 
decrease in commissions charged across our forecasting period. 
Moreover, Google Flights, Google’s metasearch engine for flights, launched in 
2011, is competing directly against KAYAK and Priceline. Although Google does 
not disclose any data concerning Google Flights, we know from Google Trends 
feature user searches for “google flights” on Google already surpassed 
those for Priceline.com and KAYAK (Figure 29). This poses a threat to Booking, 
as the Group currently derives 7% of its revenues from Advertising & Other 
revenues, the majority of which corresponds to advertising revenues from KAYAK. 
This threat is likely to materialize in the near future and, as such, we expect a 
decrease in year-on-year revenue growth from Advertising and Other 
revenues (Figure 30). Additionally, we analysed a scenario in which a dramatic 
loss of KAYAK’s market share to Google Flights would result in a steep decrease 
in advertising revenues11. This resulted in a valuation of $1288 per share, a 40% 
drop when compared to the base scenario of $2141 per share.  
Google entering the market as an OTA 
The advances Google has been making in the OTA business pose yet another 
risk. Recently, the company offered consumers the option to book 
accommodations directly through Google Travel. Although this offer is still 
 
11 Refer to the Chapter “Scenario Analysis” for more detailed information on this analysis 
Figure 28: Example of a hotel search on 
Google Maps; Source: Google Maps 
Figure 27: BKNG and EXPE’s total 
acquisition deals and highlights; 
Source: Crunchbase 
 
Figure 29: Keyword searches on 
www.google.com (relative popularity) 






































Figure 30: Advertising & Other Revenues 













































limited to selected locations, it might be a step towards becoming a travel agent 
itself. In this scenario, Google would hold large competitive advantages such 
as 1) the fact that it does not need to pay for advertising, as it can freely promote 
its products, and 2) the fact that it has access to larger amounts of consumer 
data than any OTA. Google’s entry in this market could, therefore, result in 
significant loss of market share for Booking Holdings. However, we do not deem 
a scenario in which Google would become the leading OTA very likely. 
Booking Holdings and the Expedia Group alone spent $10.6 billion on performance 
and brand marketing [10], the majority of which (around 80% according to our 
estimates) went to Google, accounting for advertising revenues. Moreover, anti-
trust laws would make it difficult for Google to overtake the OTAs market.  
Macroeconomic instability 
As BKNG’s products are essentially consumer goods, they are highly sensitive to 
economic conditions (in economic expansions consumption of travel products 
increases and vice versa). Since 2010, the global market has experienced 
economic expansion (Figure 32) bolstered by Monetary Policy in the U.S. and 
Europe, namely artificially low interest rates, and a growing middle class in Asia. 
In the future, we expect this trend to continue in Asia, despite China’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth slowdown. Regarding the U.S. and Europe, 
however, we are concerned that Monetary Policies, which sustained growth in the 
last decade might not be sustainable. In 2019 the U.S. registered an inversion of 
the yield curve, which is typically a sign of an upcoming recession, while Europe’s 
largest economy, Germany, suffered a contraction of GDP growth. Although the 
Group hedges against economic recessions by maintaining Government 
Securities (in 2018 these accounted for 9% of its total assets), we believe this 
scenario would cause a significant decrease in room nights, average prices 
charged and advertising revenues.  
Currency risks   
While the Group reports its results in U.S. dollars (USD), 76% of its revenues were 
earned in Euros (EUR) in 2018. Therefore, the Group is largely dependent on 
exchange rates. Although the Group invests in derivative instruments in order to 
hedge against currency risks, it is still subject to unexpected changes in exchange 
rates. In 2015, for example, as the USD strengthened against the EUR, BKNG 
reported lower foreign currency-denominated results. Although this risk has 
materialised in the past, we do not deem it relevant for our valuation, as currency 
exchange rates are extremely hard to predict, and we believe that over the long 
run unexpected currency rate differentials would tend to balance out.  
Figure 31: Google Travel's side bar; 




















































Euro Dollar Exchange Rate
BKNG's Revenue Growth
Figure 34: BKNG's revenue growth highly 
correlated to Euro Dollar exchange rate; 
Source: Macrotrends 


























Figure 33: Real GDP (% change) by 


































In the past, OTAs’ revenue growth was largely driven by consumers’ move from 
the offline to the online travel sector. In developed economies where, today, 
internet penetration is high [11], this shift may be already complete. In fact, 
BKNG has already experienced declining revenue growth in recent years. To 
tackle this problem, it is investing in different solutions (emerging economies, 
innovative products and expansion into new markets). However, if these 
investments do not materialise, the Group could face stagnating revenue growth 
and lose significant value, resulting in a share price of $1,372, according to our 
estimates, a 36% drop from our base case scenario12.  
Regulation 
Despite being a sign of strong travel demand, we believe over-tourism is also a 
significant risk to BKNG’s business, as among the most popularly discussed 
solutions for these problems is government regulation. The latter may consist of 
establishing limits for tourist arrivals or regulating short term rental supply, 
as was the case in Barcelona and New York [12]. This might become increasingly 
damaging for BKNG as the Group expands its alternative accommodations 
business. Particularly as the Group is shifting towards the Merchant Model, it is no 
longer able to defend its position as a mere facilitator of transactions between 
hosts and travellers, not carrying responsibility for collecting taxes or getting 
operating licenses [13]. Consequently, regulatory issues require the Group to 
expend significant time and resources and could end up affecting the growth 
and size of the alternative accommodations business.  
Opportunities 
Asia & strategic partnerships 
The South and South-East Asia markets report the fastest growth for outbound 
travel, with forecasted growth of 5.8% and 5.1% per annum, respectively, until 
2028, according to data from WTTC. In 2018, the Travel & Tourism industry saw 
above-average growth in the Asia Pacific region, with a 7% year-on-year 
increase in international tourist arrivals and tourism receipts. Moreover, according 
to Airbus, Asian middle class will grow by 37% from 2018 to 2028 and the 
manufacturer expects to deliver on average 816 new passenger aircraft per year 
to the region for the next 20 years. As inbound tourists need accommodation, these 
figures reflect a big opportunity for travel agencies to capture in the region.  
 
12 Refer to the Chapter “Scenario Analysis” for more detailed information on this analysis 
Figure 35: Global internet penetration rate 


































































International Tourism Receipts growth 2018
International Tourism Arrivals growth 2018
Figure 37: International tourism arrivals 
(millions) and receipts (millions USD) in 























Figure 36: Tourist arrivals in Barcelona (in 
millions); Source: Statista 
 
 








Booking has been present in the Asian region through its acquisition of agoda since 
2007 and, most recently, the Group has entered into strategic partnerships 
with local companies to further deepen its roots in the market. The first of 
these partnerships was made between Booking.com and Trip.com in 2014, where 
the Group entered into a commercial agreement to share access to the companies' 
combined hotel inventory. Similar agreements were made with Meituan-Dianping, 
Didi Chuxing and most recently, Grab, a ride-hailing app, operating mainly in 
Southeast Asia. While the partnerships with Trip.com and Meituan-Dianping 
contribute to room nights growth through shared inventory, the partnerships with 
Didi Chuxing and Grab contribute to BKNG’s brand recognition through referrals 
from the Asian companies to BKNG’s websites and apps.   
The Connected Trip – personalization & cross-selling 
The Connected Trip is the new buzz word among OTAs. The Connected Trip is 
similar to the concept of holiday packages and travel agents, as it aims to connect 
all aspects of travel from flight reservations, to transport from the airport, dinner 
reservations, accommodation and local activities. Major OTAs such as Booking 
and Expedia plan to use data collected from customers to personalize suggestions 
through Artificial Intelligence (AI) in real-time at each point of the trip. These 
suggestions would be the motor for cross-selling the brands’ products to travellers. 
Should this opportunity materialise, we believe BKNG would improve customer 
loyalty, and therefore direct traffic to its channels, which in turn would result in 
lower marketing costs and higher operating margins. Additionally, it maximizes 
revenue per customer by selling them a multitude of products, either as a bundle 
when planning the trip, or spontaneously along the trip.  
To understand the impact of a truly successful delivery of the Connected Trip, we 
analyse an upside scenario. According to our estimates, this would yield a 17% 
increase on BKNG’s stock price to $2,502, when compared to our base case 
scenario of $2,140. 
Alternative accommodations  
In 2017, the alternative accommodations market in Europe grew over twice 
as much as the market for traditional accommodations [14]. Airbnb’s 
estimated total revenues for 2018, of which 99% were derived from alternative 
accommodations, were $4.4 billion, up 40% from the previous year [15] [16]. 
BKNG, in 2018, reported that 20% of its total revenues, or $2.9 billion, came from 
alternative accommodations. This places Airbnb as the market leader for the 
sector but shows BKNG is catching up. As we expect the market for alternative 
accommodations to continue growing in the next years, we believe continuing 
Figure 38: Forecast of new passenger 
aircraft to be delivered in the next 20 
years by Airbus; Source: Airbus 
Figure 39: Accommodation Market Growth 
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Figure 40: Total global accommodations by 












expansion into the market is an opportunity for Booking to derive further growth in 
the future.  
Competitive landscape 
The Market for Online Travel Agencies around the world is fragmented, as most 
players are small domestic private players operating on niche markets. There are 
only a selected few truly international players operating on a global scale. As 
such, the market is experiencing a consolidation trend with the largest OTAs 
increasingly acquiring smaller companies to consolidate their leading positions, 
develop inhouse expertise and expand to other markets, as mentioned above. 
When comparing leading Online Travel Agencies in 2018, Booking Holdings held 
the first place for the company generating the most revenues and with the 
highest market capitalization. The latter, at $84 billion corresponds to almost 4x 
as much as that of the second and third largest players, Trip.com with $20 billion 
and Expedia with $16 billion, respectively. As Airbnb is still a private company, its 
market capitalization is uncertain, but studies place it at $31 billion, which would 
make it the second-largest player in the market by market capitalization. Google 
Travel was not considered when analysing revenues nor market capitalization due 
to lack of reliable data. 
Applying Porter’s Five Forces framework to the sector, we understand: bargaining 
power of customers is extremely high as travellers are becoming increasingly 
sensitive to prices, jumping between travel websites until they find the cheapest 
product to book; bargaining power of suppliers is moderately low as suppliers 
(hotels, property owners, car rentals, airline companies, etc.) are increasingly 
dependent on OTAs for customers; despite the fact that there are no licensing 
requirements to begin operations and capital requirements are relatively low, 
barriers to entry are relatively high, given the increasing scale of the market’s 
largest players; there is high intensity of competitors, as previously mentioned; 
and high threat of substitutes, as a new wave of players, such as Google and 
Airbnb, threatens to disrupt the travel industry. 
Google Travel 
As described in the Risks section of this report, Google Travel represents BKNG’s 
greatest competitor. However, lack of available data prohibits us from further 
analysing this competitor’s financials and overall business.  
The Expedia Group (NASDAQ: EXPE)      
The U.S. based travel group operates a large portfolio of brands, which it groups 



















Figure 41: Online Travel Agencies with the 
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Figure 42: BKNG vs EXPE's historical stock 
price in USD; Source: Bloomberg 
 
 








Group derives most of its revenues from the OTA segment, which includes its 
largest brand, Expedia. The Egencia segment, which comprehends Orbitz for 
Business in addition to the Egencia brand itself, is a global B2B solution offering 
corporate clients travel management services. This segment positively 
differentiates Expedia’s offer from BKNG’s, as the latter has yet to offer a service 
fully specialized in business travel.  
Unlike Booking Holdings, the majority of Expedia's revenues are domestic. We 
believe this key difference between the two partially explains the major differences 
in profitability. While the accommodation market in Europe is mostly composed of 
boutique hotels, in the U.S. it is dominated by large hotel chains. The latter have 
more bargaining power in negotiations with OTAs than the former, which explains 
EXPE’s lower commission fees, with a revenue margin of 11.3% in 2018, when 
compared to BKNG’s 15.7%. 
Another key difference between the two is their brand recognition. While BKNG’s 
main source of revenues remains Booking.com, Expedia’s revenue sources are 
more equally distributed between its brands, of which none benefits from the same 
recognition as Booking.com [17]. This results in greater dependence on paid 
sources of traffic rather than direct traffic when compared to BKNG and leads to 
greater performance advertising costs and lower profit margins.  
The Trip.com Group Limited (NASDAQ: TCOM)   
The Chinese OTA holds a majority stake in many companies under its name, most 
notably Trip.com Limited (100% ownership stake), Skyscanner (97% ownership 
stake), and Qunar Cayman Islands Limited (43% ownership stake). Following a 
2018 deal, Booking Holdings now holds an 8% stake in Trip.com. Moreover, 
the two companies have combined resources, with Booking.com and Trip.com 
sharing hotel inventory and Trip.com referring their clients to Booking Holding’s 
Open Table. Despite operating in the same industry and, in many cases, 
competing for the same client base, Trip.com's business model sets itself apart 
from Booking’s and Expedia’s, as its main source of revenue stems from 
Transportation ticketing, which corresponded to 42% of total revenues in 2018, 
down from 45% in 2017.  
TCOM’s key competitive advantages over BKNG rely on the fact that the former 
derives most of its revenues from China, where Google does not operate. This 
results in lower advertising costs (as a percentage of revenues) for Trip.com 
(around 19%) than those reported by Booking Holdings (31% for performance 
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Figure 45: BKNG vs TCOM's historic 




















Figure 44: BKNG vs EXPE's margins, 

















Figure 46: BKNG vs TCOM's margins; 
Source: Bloomberg, Company Reports 
Figure 43: Domestic over total revenues 
per Group; Source: Company Reports 
 
 








Trip.com’s higher R&D and personnel expenses, as described in the chapter 
“Company overview”.  
Airbnb, Inc. 
The San Francisco based company offers apartments, houses and vacation 
rentals’ reservations. Airbnb is allegedly the market leader for the alternative 
accommodations market, benefitting from higher brand recognition than its 
competitors. This is its main competitive advantage over BKNG, as it threatens the 
Group’s ability to grow within the market. More recently, Airbnb has taken steps to 
expand its business and step up the competition with the likes of Booking Holdings 
and Expedia. In 2016, it expanded its offer with the launch of its Experiences 
business and in 2017 launched Aibiying, the Chinese adjusted Airbnb brand. The 
company has also made some acquisitions in preparation for its IPO next year, 
namely Urbandoor (which offers business travellers extended stays) and 
HotelTonight (which offers last minute accommodation bookings). Both these 
acquisition deals were part of a broader strategy of the company to expand its offer 
beyond the market of alternative accommodations. 
TripAdvisor, Inc. (NASDAQ: TRIP)  
TripAdvisor, Inc., splits its operations into two main business segments: hotel and 
non-hotel. Through its hotel business, TRIP acts mostly as a booking supplier, 
redirecting customers to its partner websites (Expedia.com, Booking.com, etc.). 
Through its non-hotel segment, it offers experiences, restaurants and home 
rentals. The company operates a large portfolio of brands, the largest being 
TripAdvisor. TRIP’s main value proposition differs from that of BKNG and its other 
competitors, as the former focuses on delivering travel reviews to customers in 
a stage prior to booking. It helps them decide where to go and stay, where to eat 
and what to do. Moreover, TripAdvisor is better positioned to deliver the Tours & 
Activities (or Experiences) product, as its subsidiary Viator is the market leader in 
the U.S. in the segment [18]. This represents an important competitive advantage, 
as the Experiences segment is an essential part of the Connected Trip, BKNG is 
striving to deliver.  
Valuation 
DCF approach  
We followed a Discounted Cash Flows (DCF) Model to value Booking Holdings, 
as we believe this to be the method that better captures the value the firm will 
derive to its shareholders. Firstly, the DCF allows for detailed assumptions and 
Figure 48: "Where did you look for 
inspiration when considering which 
destination to visit?"; Sources: 
TripBarometer 2017/18 
Figure 49: Total listings offered by brand 
to U.S. consumers across 100 of the most 
popular tourist destinations worldwide; 
Source: Skift Research 
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Figure 47: BKNG vs TRIP's stock price in 
USD; Source: Bloomberg 
 
 








as such, it benefits from our intimate knowledge of the Group and of the Industry. 
Secondly, the Group’s performance depends on the occurrence (or non-
occurrence) of certain events and as such, the scenario analysis enabled by the 
DCF is yet another reason for choosing this method.   
To value the company, we used a forecasting period of 6 years from 2021 to 
2026 and applied a perpetuity growth rate to determine the terminal value. All 
future cash flows were discounted at a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
of 8.61%. The perpetuity growth rate was estimated based on long term GDP 
growth rate and inflation rate forecasts, yielding a value of 2.04%, slightly higher 
than the long term GDP forecast of 2%.  
As the Group’s performance in the future is highly dependent on how the risks and 
opportunities identified evolve, we conducted five scenario analysis and weighted 
the resulting share price according to the attributed probability of occurrence of 
the respective scenario. We included a base case (most likely) scenario, two risk 
scenarios and two opportunity scenarios.  
Our analysis resulted in a share price of $2,141, yielding a total return of 9% with 
capital gains of 4% and share repurchases of 5%. Therefore, we issue a HOLD 
recommendation for BKNG’s stock.  
WACC calculation 
To derive the Weighted Average Cost of Capital for the Group, we assumed its 
Market Debt-to-Equity (D/E) will remain stable during the forecasting period, as 
there is no evidence that the Group intends to make any major changes to its 
capital structure. At the time of valuation, BKNG’s market capitalization was at 
~$87 billion and the estimated market value of Debt at ~$9.5 million, resulting in a 
market Debt-to-Equity value of 11%. 
To estimate the Group’s cost of debt, 2.24%, we looked at its longest outstanding 
traded bond on Bloomberg. As it matures on March 2028, the bond had 7.25 years 
to maturity at the time of valuation. The Group’s credit rating is A3/A- (as rated 
by Moody’s and S&P, respectively), which gives it a 5 year probability of default 
of 0.51% and a corresponding recovery rate of 41.82%. As the bond’s Yield to 
Maturity (YTM) stood at 2.45%, we were able to derive a cost of debt using the 
following formula: 
𝑟𝐷 = 𝑌𝑇𝑀 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 
To estimate the cost of equity we applied the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
reaching a cost of equity of 9.39%. For the risk-free rate, we used the last rate of 
the U.S. Government 10Y Treasury Bond (USGG10YR), 1.94%, reflective of the 




Figure 52: Cost of Debt; 
Source: analyst estimate, 
Moody’s   
Figure 50: DCF results for base case 
scenario; Source: analyst estimates 












low interest rate environment currently experienced in the US Market. We based 
our Market Risk Premium of 5.96% on NYU Stern’s analyst estimates.  
In order to compute the raw beta of the Group, we first performed a regression 
analysis on Booking’s stock price against the S&P 500’s, dating back to 
November 2014, as to get 60 data points. This regression resulted in a beta of 
1.08 with a confidence interval of [0.58,1.57]. As the confidence interval is wide, 
we performed the same regression for a selected group of comparable companies 
based on the type of business they operate, the geography they operate in, their 
EV/Sales and EV/EBITDA multiple. From the selected Group of companies, we 
excluded the ones with the broadest confidence intervals (eDreams and 
Tongcheng). Afterwards, to exclude the effects of different capital structures, 
we first unlevered each company’s beta. Secondly, we attributed weights to 
each comparable company based on relevance and finally, computed the weighted 
average unlevered beta of the comparable companies and BKNG’s. Knowing the 
beta of Debt (through reverse engineering the CAPM formula for the cost of debt) 
and the market D/E of the Group, we were able to reach a raw beta of 1.25.  
Having all the variables necessary and assuming a tax rate of 21% (U.S. corporate 
tax rate), we reached a WACC of 8.61%, through the formula: 
[Eq. 1] 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = ∗ 𝑟𝐸 +  ∗ 𝑟𝐷 ∗ (1 − 𝑇)  
Multiples Analysis 
To find suitable comparables, we analysed the company’s peers (Expedia, 
Trip.com, MakeMyTrip, Webjet, eDreams, Despegar, Tongcheng, Meituan and 
Trip Advisor). After a selection based on geographical exposure, business 
model and relevance of the multiples, we decided to follow the analysis with 
Expedia and Trip.com. Although EXPE’s main market is the US and TCOM’s 
operations reside mainly in China, these companies are the ones that best capture 
BKNG’s worldwide exposure (Trip.com owns the UK based Skyscanner and EXPE 
has investments in Asian companies). As explained above, BKNG’s cost 
structure is different from EXPE and Trip.com, with a much higher EBITDA 
margin, which favoured the use of EBITDA to Enterprise Value (EV) or price to 
earnings ratio (P/E). Nevertheless, the three companies’ EBITDA to EV values 
are very different, which lead us to use only P/E. Using Trailing Twelve Months 
values for earnings and the most recent market caps, we reached a weighted 
average P/E of 27.09x (Figure 56).  
This value is considerably higher than Booking’s 19.97x and would lead to a share 
price of $3106.15. Although it might be the case that Booking’s current price is 
Figure 56: Comparables' Price 
to Earnings ratio 
Figure 55: Software's amortization 





Figure 54: Betas, confidence intervals and 
attributed weights of comparable 












undervalued, we are more inclined to conclude these companies are not 
appropriate comparables of BKNG, given company-specific factors. On the first 
place, Expedia’s high P/E ratio may be related to the belief from its investors that 
the company is being mismanaged and that current earnings do not reflect the 
company’s potential. In fact, Expedia’s CEO has lately resigned after 
disagreements with the board regarding strategy decisions. On the second place, 
EXPE has high investments in R&D with higher PP&E than BKNG, namely 
capitalized software development. This leads to higher amortizations and lower 
earnings in the short term (Figure 55). Finally, Trip.com’s higher pricing may be 
related to its strong and established presence in the Chinese market, where future 
growth prospects are higher than average.   
Revenue model 
The following relations must be clear to understand our revenue model,: 
[Eq. 2] 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∗  𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦   
[Eq. 3] 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 & 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 = ∑ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 ∗  𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑓𝑒𝑒 , 
 𝑛 = 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠, 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠, 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠  
To be able to analyse and forecast the evolution of each driver independently, we 
estimated an average price for each product, while quantities sold are provided by 
the Group on a yearly basis [Eq.2]. Moreover, we estimated the average fees 
charged by the Group in the past, as to be able to isolate the forecast of room 
nights fee, which is one of most impactful factors on revenues [Eq.3].  
The average price charged for rental car days was calculated based on the 
reports of rental car companies "Avis" and "Hertz", since we believe these 
companies are a good proxy of the car rentals market with a ~27% combined 
market share according to our estimates. The average price charged for airline 
tickets was based on the U.S. quarterly average airfares, provided by the Bureau 
of Transportation Statistics. Finally, to arrive at an estimate of the price charged 
for room nights in each year, considering the reported year-on-year ADR 
change, we used Excel’s tool “Solver” to minimize the difference between reported 
Gross bookings and estimated Gross bookings by changing room nights’ average 
price.  
The Group’ s Advertising & Other revenues are forecasted mostly based on 
forecasts for KAYAK, from where most advertising revenues derive.  
We applied a forecasted inflation rate to each year’s total projected revenues and 
then applied a forecasted inflation rate weighted by the number of listings in each 
country where BKNG operates. This method of forecasting inflation was chosen 
Figure 57: Rental car days, estimated 
past prices ($); Sources: analyst 
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Figure 58: Airline tickets estimated 
past prices ($); Sources: analyst 






















Figure 60: Forecasted global inflation 
weighted for BKNG's operations; 
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Figure 59: Room nights estimated past 
prices ($); Sources: analyst estimates 
 
 








over applying a global inflation rate forecast, given concerns that the latter would 
result in high rates due to the effect of hyper-inflation countries (such as Venezuela 
or countries in North-African or the Middle-East), where Booking's business is 
either non-existent or insignificant.  
To the exception of the average fee charged, all forecasts (Advertising & Other 
revenues, room nights’, rental car days’ and airline tickets’ prices and quantities 
sold) were projected based on the projection of year-on-year growth rates 
rather than forecasting actual numbers.  
Regression 
Considering how sensitive BKNG’s value is to accommodation ADRs, we 
developed a model to test our results for average prices charged. This analysis 
was based on a regression of estimated past prices and reported quantities sold 
on total reported Gross bookings, following [Eq.2], as follows: 
[Eq.4] Gross bookings = β1*Adjusted room nights + β2*Adjusted rental car days + 
β3*Adjusted airline tickets + α , 
where: (1) reported quantities sold were adjusted for price variations from the first 
period considered in the regression (the first quarter of 2013) to each quarter of 
the sample period; (2) βs are the output of the regression, interpreted as the 
prices of a room night, a rental car day and an airline ticket, respectively, in the 
first period of the regression; and (3) α represents 4 dummy variables, which 
capture the seasonal effect of the 4 quarters. After obtaining the regression results, 
we updated the βs to each quarter, based on each variable’s past quarterly price 
changes. We used quarterly values for the inputs with the purpose of increasing 
the size of the sample used. 
Average quarterly prices for room nights, rental car days and airline tickets were 
estimated based on proxys, namely average global hotel daily rates, average 
prices charged by Hertz and Avis, and U.S. domestic average airfares, 
respectively. Although these proxys are not perfect matches for room nights, rental 
car days and airline tickets’ prices, we believe these proxys’ price variations are 
a close enough estimate of BKNG’s products’ price variation. 
The only significant coefficient achieved was β1, the average price of a room 
night in the first quarter of 2013, at a price of $107.41 and a p-value of 7,4E-10. 
Updating this value to the third quarter of 2019, we achieved an average price of 
$108.12. Despite a wide confidence interval for this value, $88 to $126, the final 
price is remarkably close to the previously mentioned price, $ 108.37, supporting 
our room nights price estimation. 
Figure 61: Regression coefficient β1; 
Source: analyst estimates 
 
 








Coefficients β2 and β3’s did not yield statistically significant results through the 
regression model, with p-values of 0.36 and 0.62, respectively. We believe the 
main reasons behind this might have been: 1) the reported numbers of rental car 
days and airline tickets sold were rounded to the millions, making it difficult for the 
model to capture small variations; and 2) a very small share of total Gross bookings 
is related to other products, such as travel packages, experiences or cruises, which 
we did not include in the regression. 
Scenario analysis 
We present this analysis following a top down approach, first discussing at the 
outer level average fee’s forecasts for merchant and agency Gross bookings as 
well as revenues for our advertising model. Next, we present our forecasts for the 
main drivers (the number of room nights, airline tickets and rental car days sold). 
Finally, we analyse the impact the different scenarios have on performance 
advertising, brand advertising and personnel costs. In our model, we assumed the 
products’ forecasted prices (excluding fees) remain the same for every scenario 
and assumed total prices (including fees) only vary through changes in average 
fees. Moreover, average fees charged for rental car days and airline tickets were 
not forecasted, remaining constant throughout the analysis given their low impact 
on our final valuation.  
Scenario 1: Base Case     Share Price: $2141 
In our base case scenario, we forecasted average fee's growth to slow down over 
time, following the current trend, due to pressure from metasearch engines (such 
as Google Travel), which tend to increase price competition in the industry. The 
same applies for Advertising & Other revenues as we expect Google Flights will 
continue to adversely affect traffic to KAYAK and OpenTable.  
We believe the Group will be able to sustain moderate growth of room nights 
sold, driven by strategic partnerships in Asia and expansion into the alternative 
accommodations market. Although this growth will most likely slow down in the 
long run with increasing competition in the market, particularly given Google 
Travel’s growing popularity. In 2020 we expect a slight increase in room nights 
growth (11.6%) due to two major events that will be occurring: the European 
Football cup, which will play out across the Group’s strongest market, Europe (and 
in different cities), and the Olympic Games in Tokyo. Regarding rental car days, 
we expect them to grow at a moderately constant pace, strongly correlated with 
room nights growth, driven by efforts related to the Connected Trip, which proved 
significant already in the first three quarters of 2019 following the integration of 
Rentalcars.com with Booking.com. We believe the number of airline tickets will 
Figure 62: Scenario summary table; 


































Figure 63: Average room nights fee  
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Figure 65: Room nights and Rental car 







































Figure 66: AIrline tickets' prices  



































Figure 64: Advertising & Other Revenues 
(% change); Source: analyst estimates 
 
 








most likely decline over time (we consider negative growth from 2024 onwards), 
reflecting our belief that Google Flights’ increasing popularity will steal significant 
market share from Booking’s websites for airline tickets, namely Priceline. 
We expect average daily rates (ADR) for room nights to decrease over time. In 
the short run ADRs are forecasted to decrease at a slightly more rapid pace, driven 
by the Group’s expansion into Asia and the alternative accommodations market, 
which practice lower rates. In the long run, as expansion into these markets begin 
to decelerate, we expect ADRs to decrease at a slower pace. Average prices 
charged for rental car days will likely follow the same trend as room nights’ ADRs 
due to growing presence in the Asian market. As for airline tickets, we forecasted 
average price changes to reflect correlation to forecasted changes in oil prices. 
Regarding costs, in the short run we expect performance marketing to decrease 
as a percentage of revenues and brand marketing to increase accordingly, given 
our belief that the Group will most likely be able to strengthen its direct channel, 
becoming less dependent on paid marketing channels. Nevertheless, as we expect 
consumer preference for metasearch engines to grow, we forecasted a medium to 
long term decrease in BKNG’s direct channel and a greater dependence on paid 
channels, leading to higher performance marketing costs. Finally, we expect 
personnel costs growth to decrease in the future as a consequence of economies 
of scale.  
Scenario 2: Google Travel      Share Price: $1,287 
In this scenario we assumed Google Travel will become much more popular than 
in our base case scenario resulting in greater dependence of BKNG on paid 
channels, higher competition and loss of market share. Increasing competition, 
particularly price competition, would force Booking Holdings to decrease its 
average room nights fee charged in order to stay competitive. Additionally, 
should this scenario materialise, we expect KAYAK to lose significant traffic to 
Google Flights, which would adversely impact Advertising & Other revenues. 
We forecasted this item to start slowing down its growth in the short term and then 
decrease from 2022 onwards. 
Under this scenario, loss of market share in the accommodations business would 
result in a significant slowdown of room nights growth. However, as Google does 
not have a strong presence in the Asian market, we believe BKNG would still be 
able to derive some growth in the number of room nights sold. While rental car 
days growth would follow the same trend as room nights, due to integration 
between the two brands, airline tickets would fall significantly for the same reason 





















Figure 68: Airline tickets (% change) 





















Figure 70: Performance marketing costs 
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Figure 69: Average room nights fee 




























Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Figure 71: Advertising & Other 
Revenues (% change) Scenario 1 vs 





























Figure 72: Room nights, rental car days 
and airline tickets (% change) Scenario 






































room nights rental car days
Figure 67: Room nights and Rental car 
days's ADRs excluding fees (% change); 
Source: analyst estimates 
 
 








Becoming highly dependent on Google Travel would result in an increase in 
performance marketing costs as a percentage of revenues. However, this would 
be a moderate increase as we believe performance marketing under Google 
Travel would become more efficient. In the current model, customers look for “hotel 
room” on Google Search and click on the first three or four websites to compare 
prices amongst websites. With Google Travel, customers would already be able to 
compare offers from different websites before clicking on a link, making the “pay 
per click” model more efficient. Finally, personnel costs would experience a slight 
slowdown, as we assumed Priceline and KAYAK would be forced to incur in cost 
containing strategies.  
Scenario 3: Stagnation of Room Nights Growth   Share Price: $1,287     
In this scenario we analysed the Group’s value assuming (1) BKNG’s expansion 
into the Asian market is not successful, (2) it is not able to deliver the Connected 
Trip and (3) it is not able to derive the expected growth from the alternative 
accommodation’s market. The latter might happen either because this market 
becomes saturated, the Group is not able to effectively compete against Airbnb or 
due to local Government’s regulations. As such, the main implications would be on 
room nights growth, which would experience a significant decrease to levels 
close to 0. Once again, similar changes in rental car days growth would follow. 
Personnel costs, although not as significant, would also decrease driven by lack 
of business growth. 
Scenario 4: Direct Channel     Share Price: $2,797 
In this scenario, we play out Glenn Fogel’s vision of the Group, where BKNG is 
able to enhance its direct channel substantially, mainly due to the success of brand 
marketing campaigns. There are three main implications of this scenario. The first 
is gaining flexibility to increase average fees charged, given that the Group is not 
dependent on Google Travel and therefore price competition becomes less 
impactful. The second is a decrease in performance marketing costs as a 
percentage of revenues. Lastly, the third consequence of this scenario is a slight 
increase in brand marketing costs as a percentage of revenues. As the Group 
becomes more dependent on the direct channel for traffic to its websites, we 
expect it to increase brand marketing spending in order to retain its customer base. 
Scenario 5: Connected Trip     Share Price: $2,500 
In the last scenario, we play out how a fully delivery of the Connected Trip within 
the next years would affect the company’s valuation. We believe the success of 
the Connected Trip would increase brand loyalty, mobile payments and as a result, 
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Figure 73: Performance marketing (as a % 
of revenues) Scenario 1 vs Scenario 2; 


























Room nights Rental car days
Figure 74: Room nights and rental car days 


























Scenario 1 Scenario 4
Figure 75: Average room nights fee 
Scenario 1 vs Scenario 4; Source: 
analyst estimates 
Figure 76: Advertising & Other Revenues 
(% change) Scenario 1 vs Scenario 4; 
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Scenario 1 Scenario 5
Figure 77: Room nights average fee 












selling and in the number of packages purchased as a result of greater 
interconnectivity between the Group’s brands. 
As packages are often sold at a discount, we expect this scenario to result in a 
decrease of the average fee charged (assuming, for simplicity purposes, that the 
Group can only influence prices through the fee charged). On the other hand, we 
expect Advertising & Other revenues growth to accelerate due to an increase in 
traffic to KAYAK’s websites, resulting from cross-selling of products as well as 
greater brand recognition. 
We believe the Connected Trip would accelerate growth in all three main drivers 
for the same reasons stated above, namely cross-selling of products, greater 
brand recognition and enhanced brand loyalty.  
Regarding costs, we believe the Group would become less dependent on 
performance advertising for traffic to its websites and apps, given a 
strengthening of the direct channel. Furthermore, cross-selling would make 
performance advertising more efficient as more products would be sold per 
customer and hence, per dollar spent in performance advertising. To 
counterbalance this, we expect brand marketing to increase due to the need for 
promotion of the Connected Trip as well as greater dependence on the direct 
channel. Finally, we expect personnel costs to slightly increase, given the greater 
complexity of systems and software that would arise from implementing the 
Connected Trip.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
We performed a sensitivity analysis to better understand how sensitive our 
valuation of the Group is to a selection of indicators, namely WACC, terminal 






Analysing Table 5, we conclude that share price is more sensitive to WACC than 
to the terminal value’s growth rate (TVGR). For equal percentage changes (-20% 
and 20%), the average price difference between upper and lower TVGRs is $250, 
while WACC’s corresponding average difference is $340. This is not surprising, as 

























Scenario 1 Scenario 5
Figure 80: Performance marketing costs 
(as a % of revenues) Scenario 1 vs 






























Figure 79: Room nights, rental car days 
and airline tickets (% change) Scenario 5; 
Source: analyst estimates 


























Scenario 1 Scenario 5
Figure 78: Advertising & Other Revenues 
(% change) Scenario 1 vs Scenario 5 
 
 








value (after 2026). Furthermore, the analysis tells us our recommendation is robust 
for these estimates, as WACC would have to increase by 20% and TVGR would 
have to decrease by 10% for our “Hold” recommendation to be downgraded. 
Regarding Table 4, we can see that our model is much more sensitive to Room 
nights CAGR than to ADR’s CAGR, which strengthens our thesis that Booking’s 
future performance is highly dependent on the ability to derive room nights growth. 
Looking outside the table we estimate that, keeping ADR’s growth at 0%, BKNG 
would still need to derive a 7.7% room nights growth for us to keep our “Hold” 
recommendation. We believe the company can only attain these levels of growth 
by continuing its move into lower ADR’s markets like the alternative 
accommodations and Asia. 
Additionally, it is interesting to note that, according to our forecasting assumptions, 
the share price on December 31st, 2019 implied a room nights’ CAGR of 9%. This 
showcases investors’ high expectations for this driver’s future growth. 
Conclusion 
As our sensitivity analysis shows, Booking Holdings’ future performance is highly 
dependent on its ability to derive room nights growth. In fact, current share 
price reflects high investors’ expectations regarding this driver’s growth. We 
identified key opportunities for the company that, if successfully seized, will ensure 
the necessary growth to meet these expectations.  
While we expect expansion in the Asian and in the alternative accommodations 
market will bring BKNG new sources of room nights growth, delivering the 
Connected Trip will help the Group increase customer loyalty and brand 
recognition, strengthening its competitive stake in the market.   
Nevertheless, we also identify headwinds ahead threating Booking’s performance. 
We expect Google’s overwhelming impact in the Travel market to lead to higher 
dependence on advertising and fiercer competition in the OTAs’ market, 
affecting BKNG’s margins and growth. 
All in all, given the uncertainties concerning the Group’s ability to successfully 

















in millions of USD 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 
 
               0 
Agency Rev. 7,982 9,714 10,480 10,059 10,982 11,733 12,547 13,428 14,204 15,002 15,735 
Merchant Rev. 2,048 2,133 2,987 3,833 4,562 4,874 5,212 5,578 5,900 6,231 6,536 
Advertising & Other Rev. 713 834 1,060 1,150 1,279 1,446 1,585 1,709 1,818 1,914 1,981 
Total Revenues 10,743 12,681 14,527 15,041 16,895 18,051 19,303 20,658 21,852 23,079 24,208 
Marketing Expenses -142 -189 -233 -275 -277 -296 -317 -339 -359 -379 -397 
Other SG&A -2,781 -3,184 -3,804 -4,344 -4,646 -5,015 -5,401 -5,778 -6,112 -6,437 -6,755 
EBITDA 7,405 9,066 10,490 10,422 11,972 12,739 13,584 14,541 15,381 16,263 17,056 
D&A -309 -363 -426 -533 -610 -683 -759 -817 -875 -937 -1,000 
Lease adjustment 33 40 39 51 56 61 65 70 74 77 81 
EBIT (adj. for leases) 7,129 8,743 10,103 9,940 11,417 12,117 12,890 13,794 14,580 15,404 16,137 
Operating cash taxes -987 -2,121 -952 -914 -1,081 -1,141 -1,210 -1,288 -1,352 -1,424 -1,488 
NOPLAT 6,143 7,968 9,104 9,026 10,336 10,975 11,680 12,506 13,228 13,980 14,648 
                 
Net Income 5,384 6,506 8,721 9,242 10,287 10,752 11,389 12,142 12,793 13,487 14,046 
 
 in millions of USD 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 
                 
Net PP&E 347 480 656 771 841 904 877 857 857 860 853 
Net Intagible Assets 1994 2177 2125 2146 2173 2207 2246 2292 2343 2399 2461 
Working Capital  283 239 258 -220 235 253 273 299 322 343 362 
Goodwill 2397 2738 2910 2885 3187 3326 3464 3603 3741 3880 4018 
Others -347 -1071 -915 -787 -417 -191 36 265 489 712 938 
Core Invested Capital 4674 4563 5033 4795 6019 6498 6897 7315 7752 8194 8633 
                 
Long term investments 9591 10873 8408 4319 5069 7581 10423 12395 14859 17540 20334 
Short term investments 2219 4860 3660 973 1352 3069 5019 6404 8304 10155 12588 
Others 1105 1383 1695 2710 3058 3267 3494 3739 3955 4177 4382 
Non-Core Inv. Capital 10922 14544 10641 4352 5423 9585 14303 17580 21874 26333 31494 
                 
Debt 7642 10134 9223 8960 9037 10959 13025 15055 16737 19705 22771 
Excess Cash 1866 2288 2333 4434 2910 1726 1129 1740 1058 1598 1620 











                 














in millions of USD 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 
                 
NOPLAT 2894 2457 4429 4346 5063 5369 5685 5987 6255 6558 6827 
Depreciation and 
Amortization 
377 444 537 643 730 813 900 967 1033 1103 1174 
Operational Cash Flow 3270 2901 4966 4989 5793 6182 6585 6953 7289 7661 8001 
Investment Cash Flow 594 -333 -1007 -404 -1954 -1293 -1298 -1386 -1470 -1545 -1614 
Core Free Cash Flow 3864 2568 3959 4584 3839 4890 5287 5568 5819 6116 6387 
                 
Operational Cash Flow -982 448 -500 554 115 124 133 143 154 165 178 
Investment Cash Flow -2517 -3622 3903 6289 -1071 -4161 -4718 -3277 -4294 -4460 -5161 
Non-Core Free Cash 
Flow 
-3499 -3174 3403 6843 -956 -4037 -4585 -3134 -4140 -4294 -4983 
                 
Total Free Cash Flow 365 -606 7361 11427 2883 852 701 2434 1679 1822 1404 
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Buy Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
of more than 10% over a 12-month period. 
Hold Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
between 0% and 10% over a 12-month period. 
Sell Expected negative total return (including expected capital gains and expected 
dividend yield) over a 12-month period. 
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Booking Holdings’ performance depends on its ability to derive room nights growth in the 
future. One of the key opportunities identified for Booking to grasp this growth is further 
expansion within the market of alternative accommodations.  In this report, I assess the size of 
the opportunity, arriving at an estimation of Booking’s alternative accommodations room nights 
growth. To do so, I first study the market for alternative accommodations and its main players, 
analyzing the drivers propelling it, as well as the challenges it faces. Secondly, I focus on the 
impacts expansion into this market would have on Booking’s revenue sources. 
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The Opportunity behind Alternative Accommodations 
Alternative Accommodations Overview 
Alternative accommodations refer to any accommodation available outside the traditional 
market channels (hotels). They can be segmented into (1) traditional vacation rentals, which 
are secondary residences often associated with beach or ski residences; and (2) home 
sharing, which are often the primary residence of property owners1. While the former 
typically attract older demographics for a longer duration (~ a week), the latter are typically 
cheaper, located in urban centres, rented for shorter periods of time and preferred by 
younger travellers2.  
Home sharing is the fastest growing segment of the alternative accommodations market. Its 
listings grew as much as 31% year-on-year (YoY) in 2018 alone, compared to a figure of 3% 
for traditional vacation rentals. However, listing’s growth for home sharing is slowing down, 
since just 3 years before, in 2015, YoY growth was at 125%. Nevertheless, this slowdown does 
not seem to be a sign of distress in the market, but rather a reflex of early signs of maturity3. 
Drivers  
Demand in the alternative accommodations market was largely prompt by the Travel & 
Tourism industry growth, coupled with increasing popularity of short-term rentals. While 
a rising tourism industry boosts demand for vacation 
rentals in locations such as beaches and ski resorts, 
home sharing offers a practical solution for urban 
centres, where housing supply is limited, location is key 
and prices are often high. In fact, price is often quoted 
as the main reason for choosing alternative 
 
1 Cleveland Research Company, "Breaking Down the Global Accommodations and Vacation Rental Market," 2019. 
2 Y. Finance, "New Phocuswright Data Shows One in Three U.S. Rentals Now in Urban Destinations," 19 January 2017. 













Easy to use app/site
Party accommodation
Figure 1: Survey question “What are the most 
important factors that led you to use Airbnb?”; 
Source: Morgan Stanley  
accommodations over hotels4.  
Regulation Risks 
A potential threat to the market’s growth is Government regulation of home sharing. This has 
already taken place in some cities, where residents argue the spread of short term rentals, which 
is often associated with “over tourism”, leads to rising housing prices. Regulations in the market 
may come as limits to the number of nights each property may be rented, restrictions to the 
number of properties available for home sharing, or even as a complete ban on home 
sharing solutions5. Imposing fines for hosts in Berlin and Santa Monica led to a decline of 49% 
and 37% in listings, respectively, while limiting the number of days a host could rent an 
apartment to 90, led only to a 5% decline in listings in San Francisco6. In Barcelona, limiting 
licensing for all tourist accommodations actually increased the number of Airbnb listings.  
Government regulation is a complex issue as it adversely affects many stakeholders (companies 
operating in the retail and/or travel industry, local businesses, etc.). As such, and given what 
has been done so far, I do not believe these regulations will have a significant impact on the 
market for alternative accommodations in the near future. 
Competitive Landscape 
As of 2018, there were 115,000 vacation rental companies7. While 60% were European, 20% 
were from the U.S. and the remaining were scattered throughout the world, showcasing the 
global market is quite fragmented.  
The three top players in the market are Airbnb, Booking.com and Expedia’s Vrbo family of 
brands (including HomeAway). Together they hold 53% of the market, according to my 
analysis. In addition to benefiting from higher brand recognition than its peers8, Airbnb has 
 
4 Morgan Stanley, "Global Insight: Who Will Airbnb Hurt More - Hotels or OTAs?," 2015. 
5 McKinsey & Company, "Coping With Success: Managing Overcrowding in Tourism Destinations," 2017. 
6 S. Shatford, "Airbnb Regulation: How is Legislation Impacting the Growth of Short-Term Rentals?," 2017. 
7 iPropertyManagement, "Vacation Rental Industry Statistics," 2019. 
8 SharesPost, "2018 Alternative Accommodations Consumer Survey," 2018. 
recently announced a 9 year partnership with the Olympic Games, starting in 2020. The deal 
covers the next winter and summer games in some of the top markets globally for private 
accommodation rentals. It is expected to generate both a wave of new Airbnb hosts, as well as 
an influx of new clients for the company, strengthening the brand’s competitive position as 
market leader.  
BKNG is still significantly behind Airbnb in the market for alternative accommodations, 
particularly in terms of brand recognition. Nevertheless, it holds some smaller competitive 
advantages. Firstly, it has a larger consumer base than Airbnb, which benefits hosts by 
enhancing their reach. Secondly, it provides better customer experience, since unlike Airbnb, 
all properties listed are instantly bookable, ie do not require approval from the host before 
booking. 
Impact on Costs 
The alternative accommodations business adds significant complexity to the Group. Other than 
offering fewer rooms per property, expansion of this business line is likely to lead to 
shrinking operating margins. As most property owners are non-professional homeowners, 
not able to offer the payment options increasingly demanded by travellers9, the Group is 
pushing forward its merchant business.  
This model brings incremental costs such as personnel, payment processing fees and fraud. 
Additionally, as the Group shifts towards the Merchant Model, it is no longer able to defend its 
position as a mere facilitator of transactions between hosts and travellers, not carrying 
responsibility for collecting taxes or getting operating licenses10. Consequently, regulatory 
issues, which differ from the market regulations discussed above, might require the Group to 
expend significant time and resources and could eventually end up affecting the growth and 
size of the alternative accommodations business. 
 
9 Statista, "Preferred online retail payment methods worldwide 2017," 2017 
10 Skift, "Booking Holdings’ Push Into Homesharing Feels Like a Return to Its Roots," 03 September 2019.  
Impact on Revenues  
As previously mentioned, BKNG recently stated 20% of its total revenues in 2018 accounted 
for alternative accommodations. Assuming the remaining 80% will grow at the year-on-year 
growth rates forecasted in our group report, I isolated and forecasted the Group’s alternative 
accommodations business. To do so, I assumed (1) average fees charged  for room nights within 
the category will be the same as those forecasted in our group report; (2) in each year of the 
forecasting period, prices charged for the alternative accommodations business were 5% less 
than those forecasted in our Revenue Model for BKNG. Applying the following formulas, I 
reached an estimate of 184 room nights sold in the category in 2018:  
[Eq.1] Gross Bookings = Revenues / Average fee 
[Eq.2] Room nights = Gross Bookings / Price  
According to Cleveland Research Company, Total 
Global alternative accommodations Gross Bookings 
were close to $115,000 million in 2018. Assuming an 
average market fee of 13%, I estimated a total of $14,672 million revenues for the market. 
These estimates enabled me to estimate Airbnb, EXPE and BKNG’s market shares [Figure 2].  
To forecast future room nights growth from 2018 to 2026, I applied three CAGRs 
(Compounded Annual Growth Rates) to the market’s total revenues (3.5%, 5% and 6.5%). Each 
resulted in a different value for the market’s total revenues in 2026. To each of the 3 values, I 
applied a set of forecasted market shares for 
BKNG in 2026 (ranging from 15% to 30%) to 
reach an estimate of the Group’s alternative 
accommodation revenues in 2026, a model 
similar to a sensitivity analysis. Afterwards, I 
used Excel’s Solver, to find the implicit CAGR 
Figure 3: Room Nights CAGR implied by BKNG's 























BKNG's Market share as of 2026
CAGR 4.5% CAGR 6% CAGR 7.5%
Figure 2: Market statistics; Source: analyst 
estimates,  Cleveland Research Company 
of the Group’s alternative accommodations room nights from 2018 to 2026 [Figure 3].  
As analysts forecast the global accommodations market to grow at a CAGR of 4.5%11, the 
market CAGR for alternative accommodation should stand higher than that. A conservative 
estimate would place it at 6%. Moreover, I believe the Group’s market share will most likely 
stand at 25% in 2026. These estimates lead to room nights CAGR of 12.1%, resulting in a 
CAGR of 7.1% for BKNG’s total revenues. 
Conclusion 
As the three main drivers of alternative accommodations (Travel & Tourism industry 
growth, popularity of short term rentals and demand for cheap alternatives) prevail, and 
Government Regulation seems to pose only a moderate to low threat to the industry as a whole, 
I believe the market is far from reaching a saturation point. Furthermore, the fact that it is 
highly segmented leaves room for growth through acquisitions, as BKNG and EXPE have 
done in the past in the traditional accommodations market.  
Regarding the threat of competition, while EXPE does not pose a significant threat to BKNG’s 
global alternative accommodations business, Airbnb’s position as market leader is difficult 
to challenge. Nevertheless, steady competitive advantages and an investment in brand 
marketing, should allow BKNG to grow its market share, and closely follow Airbnb, as second 
largest player. An industry CAGR of 6% from 2018 to 2026 and a market share of 25% in 2026, 
would enable BKNG to grow its alternative accommodation room nights at a 12.1% CAGR, 
larger than its forecast overall room nights growth of 9.3%, according to our group report. 
In conclusion, as the market for alternative accommodations is expected to grow faster than that 
of traditional accommodations and BKNG is expected to gain market share within the market, 
this business segment represents indeed an opportunity, although modest, for Booking Holdings 
to derive room nights growth and ultimately revenue growth in the future.  
 
11 Allied Market Research, “Travel Accommodation Market to Reach $893 Bn, Globally, by 2026 at 4.50% CAGR”, 18 
November, 2019 
